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Abstract
Recent Iterated Response (IR) models of pragmatics conceptualize language use as a recursive process in which agents reason about each
other to increase communicative efficiency.
These models are generally defined over complete utterances. However, there is substantial
evidence that pragmatic reasoning takes place
incrementally during production and comprehension. We address this with an incremental IR model. We compare the incremental
and global versions using computational simulations, and we assess the incremental model
against existing experimental data and in the
TUNA corpus for referring expression generation, showing that the model can capture phenomena out of reach of global versions.

1

Introduction

A number of recent Bayesian models of pragmatics conceptualize language use as a recursive process in which abstract speaker and listener agents
reason about each other to increase communicative efficiency and enrich the meanings of the
utterances they hear in context-dependent ways
(Jäger 2007, 2012; Franke 2009; Frank and Goodman 2012; for overviews, see Franke and Jäger
2014; Goodman and Frank 2016). For example,
in these models, pragmatic listeners reason, not
about the literal semantics of the utterances they
hear, but rather about pragmatic speakers reasoning about simpler listeners that are defined directly
in terms of the literal semantics. In this back-andforth, many phenomena characterized by Grice
(1975) as conversational implicatures emerge naturally as probabilistic inferences.
In general, these iterated response (IR) models separate pragmatic reasoning from incremental processing, in that the calculations are done
in terms of complete utterances. However, there
is substantial evidence that pragmatic processing

is incremental: listeners venture pragmatic inferences over the time-course of the utterances they
hear, which influences the choices that speakers
make. To address this, we develop an IR model
that is incremental in the sense that pragmatic reasoning takes place word-by-word (though the process could be defined in terms of different linguistic units, like morphemes or phrases).
A variant of this model was applied successfully
to pragmatic image captioning by Cohn-Gordon
et al. (2018); here we concentrate on its qualitative behavior and linguistic predictions. We
present computational experiments which demonstrate that incremental and global pragmatics
make different predictions, and we show that a
speaker that incrementally makes pragmatically
informative choices arrives at an utterance which
is globally informative. We then argue that an incremental model can account for two empirical
observations out of reach of a global model: (i)
the asymmetry between adjective–noun and noun–
adjective languages in over-informative referential behavior (Rubio-Fernández, 2016), and (ii) the
anticipatory implicatures arising from contrastive
modifiers (Sedivy, 2007). The first of these observations requires a model of language production,
while the second requires a model of language interpretation, and as such these case studies serve to
demonstrate both aspects of incremental pragmatics. Finally, we apply the model to the TUNA corpus for referring expression generation (Gatt et al.,
2009), showing that it makes more realistic predictions about attributive modifiers than does its
global counterpart.

2 Iterated Response Models
We construct our model within the Rational
Speech Acts (RSA) paradigm (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2013).
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RSA and its extensions have been applied to a
wide range of pragmatic phenomena, including
scalar implicatures (Frank et al., 2016; Potts et al.,
2016), manner implicatures (Bergen et al., 2016),
hyperbole (Kao et al., 2014), metaphor, and politeness (Yoon et al., 2016). In addition, RSA can
be cast as a machine learning model, thereby allowing us to study pragmatic reasoning in large
corpora and complex environments (Vogel et al.,
2013; Monroe and Potts, 2015; Monroe et al.,
2017; Andreas and Klein, 2016).
Standard RSA models are global in the sense
that the pragmatic reasoning is defined over complete utterances. Speakers are conditional distributions of the form P (u|w), while listeners are
of the form P (w|u), for an utterance u and state
w. We first present this global formulation (section 2.1), and then we show how to reformulate it
so that utterances are sequences of linguistic units
u = [u1 , . . . , un ] and the core RSA reasoning is
applied to each step ui given [u1 , . . . ui 1 ].
Figure 1 presents a running illustrative example. We imagine there are three referents, a red
dress (R1), a blue dress (R2), and a red hat (R3).
We have a simple language composed of three utterances, dress, red dress, and red object, each
with its expected semantics. For the RSA calculation, we make the background assumption that
the speaker and listener are playing a coordination game: they succeed to the extent that the listener can use the speaker’s utterance to identify the
speaker’s intended referent.

to attested utterances), derived from a grammar
(higher probability to grammatical utterances), or
simply assign longer utterances more cost. Intuitively, S1UTT-GP prefers utterances which are not
only true but best convey to LUTT
which world
0
the speaker is in. This is illustrated in figure 1b:
whereas all three messages are true of R1, S1UTT-GP
prefers red dress because it is the most specific. In
this sense, S1UTT-GP is a model of a Gricean informative speaker.
The pragmatic listener LUTT
in turn reasons
1
about what world state S1UTT-GP must be in such
that the observed utterance was chosen, and thus
draws more refined inferences than LUTT
. We see
0
this in figure 1b as well, with respect to dress and
red object. Whereas LUTT
regards these messages
0
as completely ambiguous, LUTT
(softly) disam1
biguates them: dress is heavily biased toward R2,
and red object is heavily biased toward R3. This
inference formalizes the intuitive reasoning that if
the speaker of red object had been referring to R1,
they would have used the more specific, informative red dress; their avoidance of this means they
must be referring to R3.
2.2

In natural language, speakers and listeners produce and comprehend utterances segment by segment. For present purposes, we define this process at the word level, but we emphasize that the
proposed approach extends both to sub-word segments (Cohn-Gordon et al., 2018) and to larger
syntactic units.
To approximate this incremental process, we
represent utterances as sequences of words and allow RSA-style reasoning to happen at the point of
production or comprehension of each word, in the
order they are uttered. We represent the end of an
utterance as a STOP token, so that the choice of
STOP as the next “word” represents the decision
that the utterance is complete.
Roughly speaking, we want to define listener models P (w|word, c) and speaker models
P (word|w, c), where c is a sequence of words
constituting the utterance so far. In order to do
this, we first must define an incremental semantics.
This incremental semantics is defined in terms of
a global semantics and the set of available complete utterances. For any partial sequence c and
set of referents W , JcK(w) 2 [0, 1] is the number
of full-utterance extensions of c true in w divided

2.1 Global Pragmatics
We define our global RSA agents as follows:
LUTT
(w|u) / JuK(w)
0

S1UTT-GP (u|w)
LUTT
(w|u)
1

/e
/

log(LUTT
(w|u)) cost(u)
0

S1UTT-GP (u|w)

Incremental Pragmatics

(1)
(2)
(3)

Here, J·K is an interpretation function mapping
utterances to functions from referents to {0, 1}.
Thus, the literal listener LUTT
is simply a proba0
bilistic version of the truth conditions established
by J·K; given an utterance u, LUTT
evenly dis0
tributes probability mass to the worlds compatible
with u according to J·K.
The pragmatic speaker S1UTT-GP is more sophisticated than a literal agent, in that S1UTT-GP reasons
about LUTT
, taking message costs into account.
0
We take cost to be a language model, which could
either be estimated from data (higher probability
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J·K R1 R2 R3

dress
red dress
red object

1
1
1

1
0
0

cost
dress 0
red dress 0
red object 0

0
0
1

(a) Reference game.

LUTT
0

R1

R2

R3

S1UTT-GP dress red dress red object

dress 0.5 0.5 0.0
red dress 1.0 0.0 0.0
red object 0.5 0.0 0.5

R1
R2
R3

0.25
1.0
0.0

0.5
0.0
0.0

LUTT
1

R1

R2

R3

dress 0.2 0.8
0
red dress 1.0 0.0 0.0
red object 0.2 0.0 0.8

0.25
0.0
1.0

(b) Global RSA.

dress : 0.43
R1

red : 0.57

dress : 1.0
dress : 0.67

R2

red : 0.0

object : 0.33

dress : 0.0
dress : 0.5

R3

red : 1.0

object : 0.5

dress : 0.0
object : 1.0

(c) Incremental RSA speaker predictions.

R1 : 0.36
red

S1UTT-IP dress red dress red object
R1
R2
R3

R2 : 0.00
R3 : 0.64

0.42
1.0
0.0

0.38
0.0
0.0

0.20
0.0
1.0

(e) Incremental utterance-level predictions from S1UTT-IP .

(d) Incremental RSA listener predictions upon hearing red.

Figure 1: Illustrative example comparing global and incremental RSA. For ease of comparison to the global model,
we do not depict the STOP token for the incremental model.

mental pragmatic speaker and listener S1WORD and
LWORD
:
1

by the number of possible extensions of c into full
utterances that are true of any world in W . Where
c is a full utterance, JcK(w) 2 {0, 1} is as in the
global model; where c is a partial utterances, JcK
represents the biases created by c.

LWORD
(w|c, word) / Jc + wordK(w)
0
S1WORD (word|c, w) /
log(LWORD
(w|c,word)) cost(word)
0

This is not the only possible way to define an
incremental semantics. One alternative is to define a probabilistic S0 or L0 directly (as in CohnGordon et al. 2018). We choose the method defined above since it is as close as possible to a
standard truth-conditional semantics and thus permits direct comparison. Furthermore, since our
incremental semantics can be generated from an
utterance-level semantics, only the latter needs to
be stipulated.

(4)
(5)

e

LWORD
(w|c, word)
1

/ S1WORD (word|c, w)

(6)

Figure 1c summarizes the reasoning of the incremental pragmatic speaker S1WORD , assuming
0 cost on all words for simplicity. This agent
prefers red as a first word when conveying R1:
S1WORD (red|c = [], w = R1) = 0.57. However,
if R3 is the intended referent, the agent must begin
its utterance with red (since hat is not an available word in this simple example). As shown in
figure 1d, this fact allows the pragmatic listener
to infer from hearing red that the referent is most
likely R3: LWORD
(R3|c = [], red) = 0.64.
1

Just as the standard RSA model presented in
section 2.1 uses as global semantics to define successive speakers and listeners, we can now define
an incremental literal listener LWORD
and incre0
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There may be cases in which there is no possible true continuation of a sequence of words
into a true utterance. For instance, no continuation of red constitutes a truthful description of
R2. In such situations, we say that probability is evenly distributed over all choices of word,
so that S1WORD (dress|c = [red ], w = R2 ) =
S1WORD (object|c = [red ], w = R2 ) = 0.5.
From the word level agent S1WORD , we can use
the chain rule to obtain S1UTT-IP , an utterance-level
speaker whose values are the result of incremental
pragmatic inferences:1
n
Y
i=1

S1WORD (ui |c = [u1 . . . ui

LUTT
0

S1UTT-X

inc : sem

LWORD
0

S1WORD

Figure 2: Two ways of constructing an utterancelevel pragmatic speaker from a semantics. The solid
green path is to obtain a literal listener over full utterances and then perform pragmatics, which gives rise to
S1UTT-GP while the dashed red path is to obtain an incremental literal listener, use it to construct a word-level
pragmatic speaker from LWORD
and then use this to de0
fine an utterance-level pragmatic speaker, S1UTT-IP .

2.3 An Utterance-level Incremental Speaker

S1UTT-IP (u|w) =

full : sem

1 ], w)

substantively different predictions. In the global
model, the speaker who wishes to refer to R1
prefers red dress. In contrast, in the incremental
model, the speaker referring to R1 prefers dress.
The reason for S1UTT-IP having these values is that
saying dress ensures the termination of the utterance (given the set of utterances that are available
in this example), which therefore has probability
1.0 at the next time step, while saying red leaves
two options, dress and object. Thus, S1UTT-GP and
S1UTT-IP are not only quantitatively different, but
even differ in their predictions about which utterances are optimal.
Figure 3 provides an abstract example which
further reinforces this difference. Moving from
left to right, the numbers in green depict the
S1WORD probabilities at each of the two steps in the
generation of a complete utterance, when the target reference is W1 instead of distractor W2. The
probability of the full utterance at S1UTT-IP is the
product of the two S1WORD steps.
An example of the difference to S1UTT-GP is
shown in green. When referring to W1, S1UTT-GP
gives equal weight to AA, BA and BB. S1UTT-IP ,
however, first chooses between A and B: in this
decision, B is preferred, since one of the two continuations of A, namely AB, is not compatible with
W1. However, if A is chosen, the subsequent
choice is fully determined to be B (p(A|[A], W1 =
1.0). This results in a preference for AA.
While we focus largely on the differences between incremental and global pragmatics, it is
worth highlighting a regard in which the former
behaves like the latter.
Given a referent r, call an utterance u weakly

(7)

Whereas S1UTT-GP in (2) makes pragmatic calculations on the basis of whole utterances, S1UTT-IP
makes incremental pragmatic decisions about each
choice of word, which together also give rise to a
distribution over utterances.
This allows for an efficient strategy,
namely greedy unrolling, to generate an
utterance from a referent r.
We choose
the first word word 1 of the utterance to be
arg maxword S1WORD (word |w = r, c = []),
and
this decision then becomes part of the context for choosing the second word: word 2 is
arg maxword S1WORD (word |w = r, c = [word 1 ]).
And so on through the entire utterance.
2.4 Relating the Global and Incremental
Models
Figure 2 depicts the core relationships between the
global and local models, focusing on the pragmatic speaker. The agents along the solid green
path define the global model of section 2.1, while
those along the dashed red path define the incremental model of section 2.2 as defined by S1UTT-IP .
Importantly, while S1UTT-GP and S1UTT-IP are of the
same type, in the sense of being conditional probability distributions over full utterances, they are
not the same distribution.
For instance, the predictions of S1UTT-IP for our
illustrative example are given in figure 1e. Comparing them with the global pragmatic speaker
predictions in figure 1b, we see that the two make
1
We use u[n] for the nth element of a list u, and u[: n]
for the sublist of u up to but not including u[n].
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Figure 3: A depiction of the probabilities of the S1UTT-IP in red and S1UTT-GP in green, for a simple abstract example.
The four utterances are AA, AB, BA and BB, while the two worlds are W1 and W2. The semantics assigns u = W1
and w = AB to 0 but all other utterance–world pairs to 1. Given a world w, the incremental speaker first chooses
the first letter to be A or B, and then chooses the second letter conditioned jointly on w and the first letter, to
obtain a full utterance. The resulting full utterance probabilities are compared with the predictions of the global
S1UTT-GP . As can be seen, the incremental and global speakers assign different probabilities to each utterance and
are consequently distinct from each other.
1
informative if LUTT
(r|u)
0
|W | , where W is the
set of possible referents. In other words, given
u, the literal listener LUTT
will guess the correct
0
referent with probability at least at chance (when
costs are 0). We note that the utterance u⇤r obtained by greedy unrolling at each step of generation, as described in section 2.3, is weakly informative. To see this, observe that the nth word
of u⇤r is arg maxword S1WORD (word |w = r, c =
u ⇤r [: n]). Since at each step S1WORD produces a
word which, at worst, does not rule out any referents for LWORD
, the resulting sentence u⇤ at worst
0
1
UTT
gives L0 (r|u⇤r )
|W | . In other words, greedily unrolling the incremental speaker will produce
an utterance which is true and has the literal listener infer the probability of the intended referent
as being at least at chance.

tractability in real-world settings where the set of
possible utterances U is large or unbounded. In
such settings, S1UTT-GP becomes intractable, owing
to the normalizing term required over U .
However, it is important to note that in the setup
presented here, S1UTT-IP is not more tractable than
S1UTT-GP . The reason for this is that the calculation
of the incremental semantics depends on factoring
the global semantics: this involves an intractable
normalization akin to that present in the S1UTT-GP .
Thus, S1UTT-IP is only computationally tractable if
the incremental semantics in terms of which it is
defined is tractable. In the present work, we define an incremental semantics in terms of a global
one, in order to allow for a maximally clear comparison between the global and incremental models of pragmatics that ensue. However, an incremental semantics (or literal speaker model) can be
defined or learned independently, as in Vedantam
et al. 2017 and Cohn-Gordon et al. 2018.

This result suggests that the strategy of choosing the most informative word (or syntactic unit)
at each point in the generation of an utterance can
be used as a substitute for choosing, from all utterances, the one which is most informative. Exploring the gap in this informativity bound is an
important future direction.

3 Application to Prior Experiments
We now briefly consider two cases where incremental pragmatics provides an explanation of a
phenomenon where global pragmatics does not
seem to suffice.

S1UTT-IP

One potential advantage of
as a plausible model of referring expression generation (over
a small, discrete set of referents) is computational
85

3.1 Over-informative Referring Expressions

where adjectives are post-nominal. In the Spanish case, let our utterances be vestido, vestido rojo,
sombrero, and sombrero azul, with the same referents and costs as before. Then there is no difference between the global and incremental models:

It has been observed that, when generating referring expressions (REs), humans often provide
more information than necessary to refer unambiguously (Engelhardt et al., 2006; Herrmann and
Deutsch, 1976). For instance, Rubio-Fernández
(2016) shows that English speakers often use redundant color terms (e.g., the red dress) in a scene
with only a single dress, where the shorter utterance dress would suffice. However, RubioFernández also notes that Spanish speakers are
less likely to over-describe with the analogous referring expression, el vestido rojo, in the same situation. This difference is a challenge for nonincremental pragmatic accounts, since, ceteris
paribus, we would expect semantically equivalent
Spanish and English REs to have the same production probability.
Using incremental pragmatics, we model the
English case as follows: let the referents be a red
dress (R1) and a blue hat (R2), and the possible
utterances be dress, red dress, hat, and blue hat,
with the obvious semantics.
We make the following assumption regarding
the cost term: assume a cost of 1.0 for all words
but a cost of 0.0 for the STOP token. Further assume that an utterance’s cost is the sum of the cost
of its words. The effect of this cost term is to penalize longer utterances, all else being equal.
On these assumptions, the globally pragmatic
speaker S1UTT-GP prefers dress to red dress,
since both are fully informative but the latter is costlier: S1UTT-GP (dress|R1) = 0.73 >
S1UTT-GP (red dress|R1) = 0.27. Meanwhile the incremental pragmatic speaker S1UTT-IP is undecided:
S1UTT-IP (dress|R1) = S1UTT-IP (red dress|R1) =
0.5. The increase in mass on the over-informative
RE red dress in S1UTT-IP as compared to S1UTT-GP
is the result of incremental processing: the decision between red and dress is made on the basis
of informativity, and both words are equally informative. However, if red is chosen, the subsequent, now over-informative word dress has to follow, since red on its own is not an utterance.
We explore the generality of this dynamic – that
incremental pragmatics may lead to the language
model being compelled to produce longer utterances – in section (4), where we apply the model
to real-world data, in the form of the TUNA corpus.
However, this effect does not obtain in Spanish,

S1UTT-GP (vestido|R1) = 0.73 >
S1UTT-GP (vestido rojo|R1) = 0.27
S1UTT-IP (vestido|R1) = 0.73 >
S1UTT-IP (vestido rojo|R1) = 0.27
When choosing the word to follow vestido, the incremental pragmatic speaker has no need to say
rojo rather than STOP, since the goal of communicating the referent has already been completed by
vestido. As a result, the speaker chooses the less
costly option, STOP. The relevant difference here
from the English case is that it is grammatical to
stop after the first word (since the first word is a
noun, not an adjective as in English).
A qualitative property which this example illustrates is a dislike in S1UTT-IP for utterances which
begin with a sequence of words which would mislead the incremental literal listener LWORD
. This
0
is the basis on which anticipatory implicatures are
formed, as discussed in section 3.2. This is not a
hard constraint: utterances which would initially
mislead an incremental listener are not categorically ruled out. However, the question of whether
this behavior is empirically justified is a worthwhile topic for future investigation.
3.2

Anticipatory Implicatures

We now turn to a phenomenon concerning language interpretation, which we will model with an
RSA listener, LWORD
.
1
Sedivy (2007) provides compelling empirical
evidence that humans draw pragmatic inferences
partway through utterances. For instance, when
shown a scene with a tall cup, a tall pitcher, a short
cup, and a key, a listener who hears “Give me the
tall–” will fixate on the tall cup before the utterance is complete.
We take this as evidence for an incremental
pragmatic listener LWORD
which can calculate an
1
implicature by reasoning that, had the speaker intended to refer to the pitcher, they would not have
had any motivation to say “tall”. By contrast, on
the assumption that the speaker’s referent is the tall
cup, the contrastive modifier serves to distinguish
the intended referent from the short cup.
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To model this implicature formally, we make
the simplifying assumption that the possible utterances are tall cup, short cup, tall pitcher, cup,
pitcher, and key. For consistency with the previous example, we assume the additive cost function
from section 3.1.
On hearing tall as the first word of an utterance, LWORD
, the incremental pragmatic lis1
tener, can draw the following inference: the intended referent is likely to have been the tall cup,
since had it been the tall pitcher, there would
have been no need to use the contrastive modifier
tall: LWORD
(the pitcher|c = [], tall) = 0.4 while
1
LWORD
(the
tall
glass|c = [], tall) = 0.6.
1
This implicature is cancelable, and indeed, were
the next word to be pitcher, we would exclude all
referents but the pitcher. In this respect, the model
represents the confusion created by uttering “tall
pitcher”, where after the first word of the utterance, the majority of probability mass is on a referent (the tall cup) which, after the second word,
has no probability mass.

4

Figure 4: An example target entity from the furniture
domain, along with its coding as a dictionary, and the
human generated referring expression for it in a context
of other images.

the dynamic described in section 3.1 generalizes
from an idealized example to real language.
4.1

Data

The TUNA corpus defines a reference game in the
sense of figure 1a. Each trial contains a set of images (entities), of which one or several are the target, and a human-generated referring expression
for the target in the context of all the images. We
refer to the full set of target and non-target entities
as the context set.
Both images and utterances are coded as sets of
attributes (figure 4). This coding defines a semantics. For instance, in figure 4, the utterance “the
grey desk” is true of the entity, since type:desk
and colour:grey are included in its attributes.
For the furniture domain, attributes such as color,
object type, and size are coded. The people domain is more complex, coding for more attributes,
including age, clothing, hair color, glasses, and
orientation. Both domains also code for the position of the image relative to the other images in
the context set.

Experimental Validation with TUNA

In order to observe the behavior of our incremental pragmatic model on real data, we make use
of the TUNA corpus (van Deemter et al., 2006).
TUNA is built around a referring expression task
grounded in images. The images are coded using
a fixed set of attributes, and the human-produced
utterances are coded using the same attributes.
Thus, TUNA lets us study the core content of naturally produced referring expressions without forcing us to confront the full complexity of natural
language.
Our goal is to show that, when a cost is imposed
which prefers shorter utterances, the incremental
model S1UTT-IP is less affected, and on average produces more two-word utterances than S1UTT-GP .
We hypothesize this on the basis of the preference of S1UTT-IP for utterances where the choice of
each word is made with high certainty. This means
that informative one-word utterances which have
reasonable probability of being extended with a
second word will score lower than two-word utterances where the choice of the first word all but
fixes the choice of the second. Since most oneword utterances admit the possibility of an extension to a second word, this dynamic would result in a preference for the longer, two-word utterances. This would provide further evidence that

4.2

Methods

For simplicity, we restrict our model to the furniture and people domains where only a single referent is provided, and consider only utterances of
two words or fewer. These constitute 32% of the
total utterances in the single referent corpora, and
to our knowledge are not distinct in other ways
than their length.
For each trial, the possible utterances are those
from the set of all two-word utterances across the
87

entire corpus (either of furniture or people) which
are compatible with at least one of the entities
in the trial. We predict the set of optimal utterances (since there may be more than one utterance with maximum probability) for both S1UTT-GP
and S1UTT-IP . For our cost function, we assume
all words have a cost of 1.0 except the STOP token, which has cost 0.0. Utterances cost the sum
of their words. This has the effect of penalizing
longer utterances.
For each trial, we have a set of entities as referents, with the designated target identified among
these entities. In addition, we can define the set of
all possible true utterances for a given trial. Thus,
it is possible to make predictions according to both
S1UTT-GP and S1UTT-IP for each trial without having
to enrich the TUNA dataset in any way.

would be desirable to use a more direct proxy for
over-informativity than preference for longer utterances.

5 Conclusion
In summary, we have defined a formal notion of
incremental pragmatics, with respect to both production and comprehension, and shown that it differs in meaningful ways from global pragmatic behavior, at least within the RSA paradigm. The
core differences are the sensitivity to word order,
which varies cross-linguistically in a way which
core pragmatic reasoning does not, and the ability
of an incremental model to calculate implicatures
partway through an utterance. We compared these
models using simulations, and we assessed them
using existing psycholinguistic data and using a
new experiment with the TUNA corpus.
Exploration of RSA as a machine learning
model is now underway, and this is helping to
show the value of pragmatic reasoning in important NLP tasks. Such work forces us to confront
the fact that the idealized RSA speaker agent must
reason about all possible utterances – the normalization constant in (3) demands this. Prior work
has sought to get around this by simplifying the
space of possible utterances (Monroe and Potts,
2015) or by sampling a small set of utterances
to approximate this normalization (Andreas and
Klein, 2016; Monroe et al., 2017). Neither solution is ideal. The incremental approach offers a
scalable alternative, as long as the incremental semantics is learned, as in Cohn-Gordon et al. 2018
and Vedantam et al. 2017.
There is also much to be done in assessing
the incremental model in the context of on-line
sentence processing. We have begun to identify
the key properties of the model, but the degree
to which these properties accord with empirical
data on production and comprehension remains a
largely open question.

4.3 Results
As expected, we find a preference for longer utterances; out of the 114 people trials, S1UTT-GP identifies 120 two-word utterances as optimal, compared to 287 for S1UTT-IP . In the 83 trials of the
furniture domain, S1UTT-GP marks 88 two word utterances as optimal, compared to 149 for S1UTT-IP .
(More than one utterance may be optimal for a
given trial, in the event that multiple utterances
have the same, maximal probability of being chosen.)
An example of a representative case is the trial
where the entity in figure 4 is the target, and
no other distractors are grey, although others are
desks. In this case, both “grey” and “a grey desk”
are fully informative, in the sense of only being
compatible with the target. With the cost term
having the effect of penalizing longer utterances,
S1UTT-GP chooses “grey” as optimal. For S1UTT-IP ,
however, neither of these utterances are optimal,
because probability is divided between stopping
after “grey” and continuing with “desk”. Instead,
the optimal utterance, “right middle”, describes
the position of the target among the images of the
context set. “Right” is not an available full utterance (as it is not attested in the data) and so no
probability mass is lost by being divided between
stopping and continuing with “middle”.
While this result offers a possible motivation for
over-informative behavior, the nature of the relation is clearly nuanced – two-word utterances are
not always more informative than one-word utterances – and merits further work. In particular, it
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